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Basins at Risk –  
Predicting International River Basin Conflict and Cooperation 
 
The existing literature identifies several factors that may influence conflict and cooperation in 
international river basins. It offers theoretical arguments to that end, and it empirically tests 
these arguments by means of qualitative case studies and large-N statistical work.1 Empirical 
testing in this research is primarily of an ex-post nature, however. That is, it seeks to account 
for incidences or levels of international river basin conflict and cooperation observed in the 
past.  
In this paper, we seek to take research one step further by moving from ex-post empirical 
analysis to predictions and forecasts. Predictions are “conditional statements about a 
phenomenon for which the researcher actually has data, i.e., the outcome variable has been 
observed.”2 A forecast “is a conditional statement about how a phenomenon will develop in 
the future and/or whose values are truly unknown.”3 Our motivation is substantive and 
practical, but also methodological. As it will become evident in the course of this analysis, ex-
post empirical results, for example in the form of regression coefficients in quantitative 
studies on river basin conflict and cooperation, may not tell us much about the actual 
influence of specific explanatory variables, such as political system characteristics, water 
scarcity, or river geography. As noted by Ward et al., “policy prescriptions cannot be based 
on statistical summaries of probabilistic models.”4  
Moving from ex-post empirical analysis to prediction/forecasting thus serves two purposes. 
First, it complements the former by allowing us to discriminate among explanatory factors 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For example, Wolf et al. 1999; 2003a; 2003b; Dinar and Dinar 2003; Yoffe et al. 2003; 2004; Espey and 
Towfique 2004; Furlong et al. 2006; Gleditsch et al. 2006; Hensel et al. 2008; Zeitoun and Mirumachi 2008; 
Brochmann and Hensel 2009; Gerlak and Grant 2009; Stinnett and Tir 2009; Tir and Ackermann 2009; Zawahri 
and Gerlak 2009; De Stefano et al. 2010; Dinar et al. 2010; Zeitoun et al. 2010; Zawahri and Mitchell 2011; 
Brochmann 2012; Brochmann and Gleditsch 2012. For a recent overview, see, e.g., Bernauer and Kalbhenn 
2010. 
2 Bechtel and Leuffen 2010, 311. 
3 Bechtel and Leuffen 2010, 309f. 
4 Ward et al. 2010, 364. 
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according to their predictive power. Second, it offers a more solid scientific basis for forward-
looking (ex-ante) analysis, which is highly relevant from a policy perspective. 
The most explicit forward-looking analysis of international river basin conflict and 
cooperation to date is the “basins at risk” study by Yoffe et al.5 This article, which was 
published about ten years ago, relied on the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database 
(TFDD).6 The TFDD codes water-related events (conflict and cooperation) in most 
international river basins on a continuum, the Basins at Risk (BAR) scale, which ranges from 
highly conflictive to highly cooperative events. Yoffe et al. correlated this scale with a large 
set of variables that might influence conflict risk or the chances of cooperation. Ultimately, 
and based on simple bivariate regressions and descriptive analysis, they identified those 
international river basins that appeared particularly risk-prone according to their analysis. On 
these grounds, Yoffe et al. placed river basins into three categories: (a) basins in which water 
conflict was already manifest; (b) basins in which conflict is possible in the future and for 
which there is evidence of existing tensions; and (c) basins in which conflict is possible in the 
future, but there is no present evidence of existing tensions. Table 1 aggregates these 




Prediction and forecasting require a robust ex-post empirical foundation. The Yoffe et al. 
study was in this respect ahead of its time, since large-N research on international river basin 
conflict and cooperation was not well developed in 2003, and made major progress only in 
recent years. Consequently, from today’s perspective, the risk-profiling part in Yoffe et al. 
was not based on a sufficiently robust ex-post explanation of river basin conflict and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Yoffe et al. 2003; see also 2004; Wolf et al. 1999; 2003a; 2003b. 
6 Wolf et al. 1999; 2003a; 2003b. 
7 Yoffe et al. 2003, 1123. 
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cooperation. Interestingly, however, quantitative studies on international basins in the past ten 
years have not made much use of advanced prediction and forecasting techniques. While the 
literature frequently cites Yoffe et al.’s work, it has not advanced the most policy-relevant 
part of that research agenda, namely the forward-looking risk-profiling component.  
This paper systematically connects ex-post empirical analysis and the “basins at risk” 
agenda. Building on recent theoretical and empirical research, we first construct an ex-post 
explanatory model. We then use prediction and forecasting methods to evaluate the predictive 
power of particular explanatory factors and identify river basins that are prone to conflict or 
cooperation. The paper mirrors thus starts with a brief review of the existing literature and 
then describes how we move from ex-post statistical inference to prediction and forecasting. 
Afterwards, we discuss the results, while the conclusion compares the findings with the 
starting point for our work, the original “basins at risk” study.  
Whereas the earlier research identified twenty-nine basins at risk, our study classifies 
forty-four such river basins. We also arrive at different findings with respect to key 
determinants of river basin conflict and cooperation. The analytical approach in this paper can 
help increase the robustness of explanatory models in other areas of international 
environmental politics, and make their findings more policy-relevant by moving from ex-post 
analysis to in-sample prediction and to out-of-sample forecasting. 
 
Explaining International River Basin Conflict and Cooperation 
We start by briefly presenting the existing literature’s theoretical arguments and findings. 
This literature has been cumulative in nature, allowing us to be very selective as we focus on 
a set of recent quantitative studies.8 This approach ensures that we use a broad theoretical 
framework for our research and also establishes the empirical base that we employ for our 
predictions and forecasts. Existing explanatory models rely either on traditional models of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 For a comprehensive review, see Bernauer and Kalbhenn 2010. 
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conflict, such as the gravity model,9 or use variables that largely belong to three general 
clusters: (a) realist variables capturing state interests and the distribution of power; (b) liberal 
variables and transaction costs; and (c) river-specific and geographic variables.10 
Brochmann and Gleditsch, building on Toset et al., Furlong et al., Gleditsch et al., and 
Owen et al.,11 apply the gravity model. According to this model, conflict over river basins is 
likely to be driven by country size (population) and power (GDP per capita), and is inversely 
proportional to the distance between states (state contiguity and capital-to-capital distance).12 
Most of these variables are also considered in Yoffe et al.13 Brochmann and Gleditsch find 
that the gravity variables affect conflict risk in the expected ways. Other explanatory 
variables, such as the size of a basin, political regime type (democracy), and river geography 
(upstream/downstream configurations) have also significant effects. 
While it seems more common to focus on conflictive interactions between states and to 
infer that the absence of conflict constitutes cooperation,14 some noteworthy exceptions have 
focused directly on cooperation. Zawahri and Mitchell,15 for example, measure basin 
cooperation in terms of treaties between riparian country dyads. To explain cooperation, they 
use proxies for state interests, notably the share of a country’s surface area in an international 
river basin, the ratio of external to internal sources of freshwater, and precipitation levels. The 
distribution of power is measured by upstream and downstream countries’ economic and 
military capabilities. Liberal arguments are captured by the democratic form of government,16 
and by the similarity of domestic legal traditions in a riparian dyad. The explanatory model 
also includes the total number of states in a basin and a measure of geographic contiguity. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Toset et al. 2000; Furlong et al. 2006; Gleditsch et al. 2006; Brochmann and Gleditsch 2012. 
10 Dinar and Dinar 2003; Yoffe et al. 2003; Hensel et al. 2008; Stinnett and Tir 2009; Tir and Ackermann 2009; 
Dinar et al. 2010; Zeitoun et al. 2010; Zawahri and Mitchell 2011; Brochmann 2012; Brochmann and Gleditsch 
2012. 
11 Brochmann and Gleditsch 2012, 521; Toset et al. 2000; Furlong et al. 2006; Gleditsch et al. 2006, Owen et al. 
2004.  
12 Brochmann and Gleditsch 2012, 522. 
13 Yoffe et al. 2003. 
14 See Brochmann 2012. 
15 Zawahri and Mitchell 2011. 
16 Marshall and Jaggers 2004. 
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Zawahri and Mitchell find that stronger dependence on freshwater resources makes 
cooperation more likely, while higher precipitation levels have the opposite effect. 
Furthermore, cooperation is more likely between democratic riparians, states with similar 
legal systems, and contiguous countries. 
Kalbhenn focuses on liberal arguments, conceptualized by political regime type and 
linkages between states.17 She argues that joint democracy increases trust and thus promotes 
cooperation between riparians. Moreover, trade relations and joint memberships in 
international organizations should be conducive to river cooperation. Kalbhenn’s empirical 
analysis, which uses the same event data for river basin conflict and cooperation that we 
employ, supports these arguments. In line with earlier research, the analysis also includes 
river characteristics, realist variables, and variables for the gravity model.18  
Brochmann addresses a similar research question as Kalbhenn.19 Her research focuses on 
all international river basins between 1948 and 1999, using the TFDD data.20 In terms of the 
explanatory variables, Brochmann argues that realist variables, such as peace years, alliances, 
and state power are likely to affect river cooperation. Her model also includes variables 
mirroring Kalbhenn’s liberal approach as well as indicators that capture river-specific 
characteristics.21 
Based on the existing literature, as briefly reviewed here, we identified sixteen variables 
that are commonly used in models of international river basin conflict and cooperation. The 
appendix summarizes these variables, points to the underlying theoretical rationales, and 
refers to the data sources.22 We construct an explanatory model including these variables as 
the starting point for predicting and forecasting basin conflict and cooperation.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Kalbhenn 2011. 
18 Kalbhenn 2011, 719ff. 
19 Brochmann 2012; Kalbhenn 2011. 
20 Wolf et al. 1999; 2003a; 2003b. 
21 Brochmann 2012, 152. 
22 Some studies also use variables for trade dependence and international non-governmental organizations. We 
omit these items due to the limited availability of data. See also Yoffe et al. 2003, 1116.   
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From Statistical Inference to Prediction and Forecasting 
As noted in the preceding section, empirical studies have shown that the explanatory variables 
we discussed (and as summarized in the appendix) have significant effects on international 
river basin conflict and cooperation. Several scholars contributing to the more general 
literature on conflict and cooperation argue, however, that drawing inferences from 
statistically significant results can be misleading to the extent that those inferences are 
unlikely to tell us much about the predictive power of a specific covariate or an entire model: 
statistically significant results may improve our understanding of the relationship between 
variables in a given sample under study, but they may not provide information on the exact 
same relationship in another sample of data.23 Yoffe et al. are at least discreetly aware of this 
limitation when stating that “[c]ategorizing a basin at risk does not presume to identify basins 
in which acute conflict will occur, but to point to basins worth more detailed investigation.”24 
We submit that moving from ex-post statistical inference to in-sample prediction and out-
of-sample forecasting can help improve the explanatory power of our models. Moreover, it 
makes research more policy relevant, because policymakers are usually not only interested in 
why conflict or cooperation took place in the past, but also what the future might bring. In 
more technical terms, as noted by Ward et al.,25 “it is quite possible to focus on statistically 
significant results that are artifacts in the sense that they do not generalize beyond the specific 
cases studied. This happens if we focus only on statistically significant relationships and may 
actually hinder our ability to generalize to out-of-sample situations, such as the future!” 
Accordingly, we examine (a) the predictive power of those explanatory variables we 
discussed (and as summarized in the appendix) using in-sample prediction techniques and (b) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 For example, Ward et al. 2010; Gleditsch and Ward 2013. 
24 Yoffe et al. 2003,1123. 
25 Ward et al. 2010, 364. 
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the ability of these variables to forecast basins at risk and those that are likely to see 
cooperation using out-of-sample approaches.26 
 
In-Sample Prediction: Assessing Predictive Power with “Existing Data” 
For our empirical work, we follow other studies27 and opt for the dyad-basin-year as the unit 
of analysis. The dependent variables measure international river basin conflict or cooperation, 
based on the International Rivers Cooperation and Conflict event data (IRCC) compiled by 
Kalbhenn and Bernauer for 1997-2007.28  
The rationale behind choosing these data is twofold. First, the IRCC data are coded from a 
uniform set of information sources. While the TFDD offers data for a longer time period than 
the IRCC, the main reason for using the IRCC instead of the TFDD is that major changes in 
the availability of news media texts over time (notably the advent of the digital revolution) 
make it problematic to use event data coded from partly changing sources for a very long 
period of time (as it is the case for the TFDD). Second, the IRCC data were coded and are 
publicly available in a format that is easier to use for an advanced statistical analysis of river 
basin conflict and cooperation than the TFDD.  
Ultimately, using the IRCC event data appears most appropriate in view of the outcome we 
want to explain: conflictive and cooperative water-related events in international river basins. 
Applying our analytical approach to other types of dependent variables that have been used in 
the literature, for instance river treaties, river claims, or militarized interstate disputes, would 
be straightforward and certainly useful. However, implementing our analysis for different 
types of dependent variables within this paper is prevented due to space constraints. Table 2 
provides an overview of the IRCC scale. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Ward et al. 2010; see also Gleditsch and Ward 2013; Bechtel and Leuffen 2010. 
27 For example, Zawahri and Mitchell 2011; Kalbhenn 2011; Brochmann 2012. 






At this point, it should be noted that international river basin conflict can, according to the 
IRCC coding rules, include “water wars,” e.g., interstate disputes over water resources. Yet, 
there is not a single event in the IRCC data that is coded as a -6 value and, thus, all observed 
and recorded events have the character of international political disputes, low-intensity violent 
actions, or international cooperative events. Similarly, however, neither the TFDD nor the 
Issue Correlates of War Project (ICOW)29 include events that would qualify as a “water war.”  
We now continue by examining the in-sample and out-of-sample predictive power (a) of 
two comprehensive models on river basin conflict and cooperation; (b) of the single 
predictors in these models; and (c) by identifying those basins that are most likely to be at risk 
or to experience cooperation in the future. Thus, after estimating the ex-post statistical models 
that are based on the IRCC data and the explanatory factors introduced above, we move 
beyond such approaches, which rely exclusively on the statistical significance of explanatory 
variables. To this end, we aggregated the IRCC data, which record individual events, to the 
dyad-basin-year, and generated two binary variables for conflict and cooperation that serve as 
our dependent variables. The first binary variable (Conflict) receives a value of 1 if the 
median IRCC score for a dyad-basin-year is negative (0 otherwise); the second variable 
(Cooperation) receives a value of 1 if the median IRCC score is positive (0 otherwise).30 
Consequently, we estimate two separate models: one for conflict (Model 1) and one for 
cooperation (Model 2). Next to the explanatory variables we discussed (and as summarized in 
the appendix), these models incorporate a conflict-years variable and a cooperation-years 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Wolf et al. 1999; 2003a; 2003b; Hensel et al. 2008. 
30 For the same or similar approaches, see, e.g., Kalbhenn 2011; Brochmann 2012; Gleditsch and Ward 2013.  
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variable, respectively, as well as different sets of cubic splines to correct for temporal 
dependencies.31 
We considered, but did not use two alternative empirical measures for the dependent 
variable. First, one could argue in favor of the yearly mean value for the dyad-basin-year 
before calculating the binary dependent variables. However, the mean is more sensitive to 
extreme values than the median, which could bias the results.32 Second, one could change the 
unit of analysis and compare individual events. While this would circumvent the issue of 
using either the mean or median for aggregation, it increases the number of observations 
substantially and, from our point of view, artificially as all of our covariates are measured at 
the country-dyad or the river basin level. In other words, using the dyad-basin-year as the unit 
of analysis avoids inflating the number of observations, but requires data aggregation either in 
terms of the mean or median – and we believe that the median is likely to be the more 
accurate choice. 
Due to the temporal scope of the IRCC dataset and because of data limitations for our 
explanatory variables, Models 1 and 2 cover the time period from 1997 to 2004, i.e., the 
period for which both the IRCC data and our explanatory variable) consistently provide 
information. While this temporal limitation might appear as a shortcoming of our research at 
first sight, it offers noticeable opportunities for the out-of-sample forecasts: we can use the 
models for 1997-2004 to forecast river conflict and cooperation in 2005-2007. Afterwards, we 
can compare those out-of-sample predictions with the empirically observed values on the 
dependent variables for the latter period in order to assess the models’ forecasting capabilities. 
Our results of the ex-post models are summarized in Table 3. 
__________ 
Table 3 
__________ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Beck et al. 1998. 
32 Kalbhenn 2011. 
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Since our main interest is in prediction and forecasting, we discuss this table’s results only 
briefly. In Model 2, for example, more water dependence is associated with more cooperation. 
Conversely, we might expect a negative coefficient for the water dependence variable in 
Model 1. This coefficient is neither negative nor significant, however. In contrast to some 
other studies, democracy reduces the probability of cooperation (Model 2). The similarity of 
the legal system has a significantly negative effect on conflict risk, but also on cooperation. 
The findings for the number of riparian states and membership in international organizations 
are similar to what other scholars found.33 It is important to note, however, that dependent 
variables and time periods differ across studies. Hence, our initial findings should not be 
viewed as an empirical contest between models, data, or samples, but rather as a plausibility 
check of our empirical setup. Either way, predictions and forecasts, which we now turn to, are 
“beyond the issue of the sign and significance of particular coefficients.”34 
The application of in-sample predictions is straightforward. First, we use the models in 
Table 3 to estimate the predicted probabilities of conflict and cooperation, respectively, for 
each dyad-basin-year. The predicted probabilities can vary between 0 (0 percent) and 1 (100 
percent), and we group these into quintiles, which we compare with the actual instances of 
conflictive or cooperative dyad-basin-years in our data. For these calculations, we refer to the 
fifth, fourth, and third quintile as the “most-likely” group, i.e., those groups of predicted 
probabilities that are most likely to match with the actual instances of conflictive or 
cooperative dyad-basin-years. The first and the second quintile, in contrast, are the “least-
likely” group, which is equivalent to those groups of predicted probabilities that are 
comparatively low and, thus, less likely to correctly predict observed onsets of conflict or 
cooperation. The findings are summarized in Table 4 and Figure 1. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 For example, Kalbhenn 2011; Brochmann 2012. 




Table 4 and Figure 1 
__________ 
The most-likely group for Model 1 includes twenty-seven out of thirty-one conflictive 
dyad-basin-years in our data (87 percent). With regard to Model 2, 416 out of 445 (93 
percent) cooperative dyad-basin-years are placed in the most-likely group. In other words, 
only four dyad-basin-years that were de facto conflictive are characterized as least-likely 
cases. Similarly, only twenty-nine out of 445 cooperative dyad-basin-years are classified as 
non-cooperative, although they were in fact cooperative. 
Figure 2 sheds more light on the in-sample predictive power of Models 1-2. The Receiver 
Operator Characteristic (ROC) plot shows the extent to which models with more predictive 
power generate “true positives at the expense of fewer false positives.”35 Thus, a perfectly 
predictive model would correctly classify all empirically observed cooperative or conflictive 
dyad-basin-years and never generate false positives, i.e., dyad-basin-years that were not 
conflictive or cooperative, although our estimations predict the opposite. The importance of 
the ROC plot is highlighted by Gleditsch and Ward:36 any “threshold for considering an event 
as predicted could be seen as an arbitrary description of the continuous distribution of the 
probabilities.” Hence, despite our careful selection of the thresholds for the most-likely and 
the least-likely groups above, this argument by Gleditsch and Ward clarifies why the ROC 
curves approach is more precise in showing the predictive power of models. Figure 2 
emphasizes that although our models do not perfectly predict either river conflict or 
cooperation, these models yield a higher predicted probability for a randomly chosen event 
than for a randomly chosen non-event. This finding is reflected in the ROC curve statistic 
(AUC), which theoretically varies between 0.50 (no predictive power) and 1.00 (perfect 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Ward et al. 2010, 366. 
36 Gleditsch and Ward 2013, 23. 
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predictive power). As demonstrated by Figure 2, our models perform well above average in 





Out-of-Sample Forecasting Using “New Data” 
The previous section leaves us with the question of how the predictive power of our models 
and their individual covariates looks like when moving to the “harder” test of an out-of-
sample forecast, i.e., what is the predictive power when trying to correctly predict outcomes 
that are not “within the very same set of data that was used to generate the models in the first 
place.”37  
Our first step in this section is a so-called 4-fold cross-validation setup38 – for the full 
models and for models that omit one or some of the explanatory variables from the 
estimation. This approach divides the existing data into four subsets, while the dyad-basin-
year observations are randomly assigned to these four different sets. All except one of the four 
subsets are then pooled together and this pooled set of observations is used to estimate the 
models shown in Table 3. The remaining subset, also called the “test set,”39 which we do not 
use for the pooled set of observations and the initial model estimation, then serves to assess 
the predictive power of the model estimated for the pooled subsets. Put differently, we try to 
predict the outcome variables of the test set with models that are based on the pooled set of 
observations, which were randomly assigned to this. Afterwards, we calculate the AUC for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Ward et al. 2010, 370. 
38 See Ward et al. 2010, 370 for a more detailed description of this approach. 
39 Ward et al. 2010, 370. 
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measuring the predictive power.40 We repeat this procedure ten times and then present the 
mean AUC for several model constellations in Figures 3 and 4.  
Figures 3 and 4 show the results (AUC values on the vertical axis) for the full models as 
specified in Table 3 and models in which certain explanatory variables are omitted (labeled as 
stages on the horizontal axis). The values presented in the first stage of either Figure 3 or 4 
indicate the AUC of the full model that leaves out one covariate at a time. Lower values than 
the value of the “Full Model stage” indicate that a covariate contributes to the out-of-sample 
prediction power of the model. Higher values than the AUC from the full model indicate that 
including a specific covariate reduces the forecasting capability of the model. Hence, 
predictors associated with lower values have a higher power for forecasts. After completing 
the calculations for the first stage, we then identified the strongest predictor (label underlined) 
and constantly left it out for the second stage (and the third stage), while repeating the 
calculations for all other covariates again. On this basis, we identified the three strongest 
single predictors for river conflict and cooperation. The reason for this is that demonstrating 
that an entire model or its alternative specifications perform above the AUC level of 0.50 does 
not allow for firm conclusions concerning the forecasting power of individual covariates. We 
thus follow Ward et al.41 and estimate the AUC for each model, dropping covariates one after 
the other.  
__________ 
Figure 3 and Figure 4 
__________ 
The forecasting power as measured by the AUC value both of the full models and the 
reduced models at the three stages, where we exclude an explanatory variable at a time, is 
generally lower for the 4-fold cross-validation than for the in-sample predictions. 
Nevertheless, the forecasting power of the full models remains reasonably high: we obtain a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Ward et al. 2010, 370. 
41 Ward et al. 2010, 367. 
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score of 0.66 for conflictive dyad-basin-years and 0.80 in forecasting cooperative dyad-basin-
years. These findings are driven by a small subset of variables for which the average AUC is 
lower than the AUC of the full model. For example, Population, Small (log) is the strongest 
predictor in the first stage of the conflict model. When dropping this variable, the out-of-
sample predictive power decreases from an AUC of about 0.66 to 0.63 in the conflict model. 
Similarly, Number of Riparian States (decrease in AUC from 0.80 to about 0.79) is the 
strongest predictor at the first stage of the cooperation model. We then discard both these 
strongest predictors from the respective model for the second stage and repeat the procedure 
of a 4-fold cross-validation for all remaining explanatory variables. After identifying the 
strongest predictors in the second stage, we reiterate this procedure for a third stage. Our 
results show, therefore, that dropping some of the explanatory variables included in Table 3 
from any model estimation would not only be misleading from the perspective of statistical 
significance, but also from the viewpoint of predictive power. However, this conclusion only 
applies to a small subset of covariates that contribute to the forecasting power of our models.  
With regard to Figure 3, Legal System Similarity, Downstream Power, and Population, 
Small (log) contribute most to the out-of-sample power, i.e., they display a lower AUC than 
the full model when leaving these items out of the estimation for the first stage; for the second 
stage, the contributing covariates are Precipitation, Downstream Power, Democracy, External 
Water Dependence, and Population, Large (log); for the third stage, only Precipitation 
contributes to the forecasting power of the conflict model. With regard to cooperation (Figure 
4), the variables Number of Riparian States, External Water Dependence, and Population, 
Small (log) are the three strongest predictors. Most other variables contribute very little to the 
cooperation model’s predictive power – IGO Membership being the most obvious covariate. 
Figures 3 and 4 also suggest that more parsimonious models can perform better in forecasting 
river basin conflict or cooperation than more complex models. Already (and only) the three 
strongest predictors for either conflict or cooperation seem to work very well in this respect. 
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Finally, in a last step to assess the forecasting power of our models, we again use the 
grouping of the predicted probabilities by quintiles and compare these with the empirically 
observed conflictive or cooperative dyad-basin-years. We used this approach already for 
Table 4 and Figure 1. The crucial difference between the models underlying Table 4/Figure 1 
above and the models (not reported here) leading to Table 5/Figure below, however, is that 
we now use the covariate values in 2004 to predict river conflict and cooperation between 
2005 and 2007. That is, we employ data for the explanatory variables in the last observed year 
(2004) and impute these into the years 2005-2007 to predict conflict or cooperation, as 
measured by our dichotomous dependent variables, in this period. This approach mirrors a 
true forecast to the extent we can make a conditional statement about how conflict and 
cooperation will develop in the future as we treat the dependent variables’ values as 
unknown.42 Again, we refer to the fifth, fourth, and third quintile as the most-likely group, 
while the first and the second quintile are designated as the least-likely group.  
__________ 
Table 5 and Figure 5 
__________ 
Based on this test, the most-likely group comprises thirteen out of thirteen conflictive 
dyad-basin-years in our data (100 percent). Slightly less accurately, 182 out of 188 dyad-
basin-years (97 percent) are captured by the cooperative most-likely group. This means that, 
although we now use “new data,” i.e., dyad-basin-years for the dependent variable that were 
originally not covered by the models in Table 3, the forecasting power in this case is higher 
relative to the in-sample predictions and the 4-fold cross-validation. This finding is upheld by 
the values of the ROC plots in Figure 6. The accuracy of the model for conflictive dyad-
basin-years increases to 0.97, while the forecasting power of the cooperation model is 0.90. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  







Basins at Risk – Revisited 
The analysis shows that our models have the ability to produce accurate predictions and 
forecasts for conflictive and cooperative dyad-basin-years. This allows us now to return to our 
principal motivation and compare our findings with the basins at risk identified by Yoffe et 
al.43 To this end and in our setup, a basin is predicted to be at risk (or to be characterized by 
cooperation) if at least 90 percent of all dyad-basin-years in both the in-sample and out-of-
sample estimations are classified under the “most-likely groups” of conflict (or cooperation) 




The first column mirrors Table 1. The second column lists all basins that appear in our in-
sample and out-of-sample predictions or forecasts of conflict and fulfill the “90 percent 
threshold.” Note that this second column lists forty-four basins as compared to twenty-nine in 
the first column. There is a rather limited overlap as only six basins appear in both lists: 
Asi/Orontes, Cross, Han, Indus, Ob, and Tigris-Euphrates. One of these six basins constitutes 
a particularly interesting case: the Cross River in Nigeria is predicted to be one of the most 
conflict-prone rivers according to our research and is also included in the list by Yoffe et al. 
However, the IRCC do not record any conflictive event in this basin, but only two neutral 
events involving consultations between riparian countries. Still, according to our work and 
Yoffe et al., conflict is likely to be dominant here. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Yoffe et al. 2003. 
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With regard to the third column, we obtain evidence that it is worth studying river basin 
conflict and cooperation side-by-side.44 This column shows that five basins, which are 
categorized as basins at risk by Yoffe et al., are predicted to have at least 90 percent of dyad-
basin-years with a cooperative median according to our estimations: Indus, Jordan, Mekong, 
Nile, and Senegal. In addition, our work suggests that six more basins are likely to be 
cooperative also in the future. Particularly the Indus River, which is shared by India and 
Pakistan, is worth examining in more detail. While it is categorized as a basin at risk in the 
Yoffe et al. study, descriptive statistics for the IRCC data suggest the same: out of the forty-
nine events coded in total between 1997 and 2007 for this basin, fourteen (29 percent) of 
those events are coded as conflictive. Note, however, that these descriptive statistics might be 
misleading. In fact, our in-sample and out-of-sample work suggests that we might observe 
more cooperative interactions in the future. 
In other words, while our approach identifies some basins at risk that were also on the 
Yoffe et al. list, substantial differences appear. Assuming that the IRCC and the TFDD data 
cover the same underlying theoretical concepts,45 the dissimilarities are probably caused by 
different methodological approaches. We believe that our approach leads to more accurate 
predictions, however. As stated above, bivariate regression models, which were used for the 
2003 study, can produce information on statistical significance; but they cannot generate 
information on relationships between variables in other samples or with regard to the 
predictive/forecasting power. 
Differences in methodology also result in differences concerning predictors. Yoffe et al. 
identified the following predictors to be most crucial: high population density, low GDP per 
capita, overall unfriendly relations between riparian countries, politically active minority 
groups, proposed large dams or other water development projects, and limited or no 
freshwater treaties. While some of these variables could not be included in our setup due to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 See also Zeitoun and Mirumachi 2008; Zeitoun et al. 2010. 
45 See Kalbhenn and Bernauer 2012. 
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limited data availability (e.g., politically active minority groups) or because they are already 
coded within the IRCC scale (e.g., water development projects and treaties), it is interesting 
that only the population variable – in our setup, Population, Small (log) – appears as a robust 
predictor for conflict (first stage in Figure 3) and cooperation (third stage in Figure 4). GDP 
per capita, for example, which is identified by Yoffe et al. as an important predictor and is 
also frequently used in other studies examining states’ river basin interactions46 as well as 
studies of armed conflict,47 is unlikely to help us in anticipating future river conflict or 
cooperation.  
These differences notwithstanding, the majority of variables classified as strongest 
predictors in our models support other studies that emphasize river characteristics and water 
availability.48 Other determinants, which are also frequently used in explanatory models of 
river conflict and cooperation, such as IGO Membership or Democracy, are unlikely to play a 
major role. Note, however, that the lack of predictive power for some of these variables that 
are seen as strong predictors in, e.g., studies on civil war, may be related to the absence of 
violent conflict in our data. The two GDP per capita variables or regime type are arguably the 
most prominent cases in this regard. That being said, civil war onset is a different outcome 
than conflict and cooperation over international river basins. Moreover, when confronting the 
statistical (ex-post) evidence for democracy with its prediction/forecasting power, Ward et al., 
for example, find that regime type is actually one of the weaker predictors.49 The point that 
we are trying to make with this paper, in line with Ward et al.,50 is that findings exclusively 
based on statistical (ex-post) evidence might be misleading, and that prediction and 
forecasting are more powerful tools in this respect. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 For example, Gleditsch et al. 2006; Stinnett and Tir 2009; Tir and Ackermann 2009; De Stefano et al. 2010; 
Dinar et al. 2010; Brochmann 2012; Brochmann and Gleditsch 2012. 
47 Ward et al. 2010; Gleditsch and Ward 2013. 
48 For example, Kalbhenn 2011; Zawahri and Mitchell 2011; Brochmann 2012; Brochmann and Gleditsch 2012. 
49 Ward et al. 2010.	  




The main purpose of this research was to put ex-post empirical models of international river 
basin conflict and cooperation to a harder test by examining their ability to predict and 
forecast variation on the outcome variable of interest. The empirical models we estimated 
perform well in the in-sample tests (1997-2004), the 4-fold cross-validation setup, and the 
out-of-sample forecast that allows for a comparison of predicted conflictive as well as 
cooperative dyad-basin-years with empirically observed cases (2005-2007).  
The motivation for our research was the “basins at risk” study by Yoffe et al. This study 
received strong attention from policy and academic circles, but was somewhat ahead of its 
time because large-N research on international river basin conflict and cooperation as well as 
research on prediction and forecasting methods has made rapid progress only in recent years. 
The main contribution of our research is to augment the most advanced quantitative research 
on river basin conflict and cooperation with a prediction/forecasting approach, and to revisit 
the basins at risk issue. It has resulted in a substantially revised list of basins at risk and a set 
of predictors that is backed-up by more robust empirical evidence. While none of the river 
basins identified is likely to experience a “water war,” our approach and its results will 
hopefully be useful for policymakers in terms of drawing their attention to basins that do or 
will require greater effort in conflict prevention and/or resolution.  
The work reported in this paper leaves several opportunities for further research. First, case 
studies should focus in greater depth on individual river basins to re-examine some of our 
findings that may appear counterintuitive. Examples include the Cross River in Nigeria (see 
above) and the Aral Sea basin. The latter is listed as a basin at risk by Yoffe et al., but is not 
identified as conflict-prone by our in-sample and out-of-sample predictions for 1997-2007. 
However, it only drops out of our list, because it is just below the “90 percent conflictive 
dyad-basin-years threshold” in the out-of-sample predictions. Moreover, while our results 
suggest that that forty-four basins are at risk, the international community will be unable to 
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alleviate the conflict potential in all those basins; in a related fashion, most of the conflicts are 
likely to be at a sufficiently low level, which the riparian countries might then be able to 
resolve themselves. Case studies could thus examine more thoroughly, which basins are likely 
to have conflicts that go beyond their own conflict resolution capacity, or why some basins 
experience both cooperation and conflict, within specific dyad-basin-years or over time, 
whereas others are dominated by one of the two interaction types.51 The Indus River, briefly 
discussed above, is a good example. 
Second, our approach reduces information on conflict and cooperation intensity to binary 
variables, whereas the IRCC scale ranges from -6 to +6. Since extremely conflictive or 
cooperative international water events are very rare, this approach is defensible.52 Further 
research could explore alternatives to using the median value of the IRCC scale for dyad-
basin-years as extreme conflictive or cooperative events might have been averaged out with 
our approach (in many cases potentially to 0). 
Finally, future research could employ the prediction and forecasting approach to strengthen 
explanatory models of river basin conflict and cooperation using other outcome variables, 
e.g., militarized interstate disputes, river treaties, or alternative event data such as the TFDD. 
Such work could be linked to the broader literature on conflict and cooperation. Our approach 
might also be used for other questions of interest in research on international environmental 
politics, such as explaining variation in environmental performance across countries or 
participation rates in and compliance with global environmental agreements. Adding 
prediction and forecasting to standard empirical models would also make them more policy 
relevant, because policymakers are at least as curious as researchers with respect to future 
trends, developments, and outcomes. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 See also Zeitoun and Mirumachi 2008; Zeitoun et al. 2010. 
52 Kalbhenn and Bernauer 2012 identify 5,881 events in total. Out of these, only 77 events have an IRCC score 




Basins at Risk in Yoffe et al. (2003) 
 
River Name River Name River Name 
Aral Sea Jordan Okavango 
Asi/Orontes Kune Red 
Ca Kura-Araks Saigon 
Chiloango La Plata Salween 
Cross Lake Chad Senegal 
Drin Lempa Song Vam Co Dong 
Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna Limpopo Tigris-Euphrates 
Han Mekong Yalu 
Indus Nile Zambezi 


























Overview of IRCC Scale 
 
IRCC Value Coding Description 
+6 Alliance – ratification of freshwater treaty 
+5 Official support – signing of freshwater treaty 
+4 Agreement/commitment 
• Closing plant in own country that possibly leads to pollution in other country 
• Financial support for water projects in other country 
• Cooperative/joint water management (irrigation, water supply, etc.) projects 
+3 Agreement of low scale 
• Meeting of environmental ministers/heads of states for talks on joint water issues 
• Drafting cooperation agreement/joint policy 
• Setting up expert group/commission (on joint water issues) 
+2 Verbal support 
• Meeting of river commission with expression of policy goals 
• Invite inspectors from other country in order to dispel doubts on possible pollution, etc. 
• Expressing willingness to come to an agreement 
+1 Minor official exchanges, talks or policy expressions 
• Meeting of high officials discussing joint water issues 
• Submitting position on joint water problem 
• Informing other country about environmental accidents 
0 Neutral acts 
• Purely rhetorical statements 
-1 Mild verbal expressions displaying discord in interaction 
• Proposing unwanted dam or other flow regulation 
• Refusing to accept compromise/solution to dispute proposed by other country 
• Failure to come to reach agreement in dispute settlement attempt 
-2 Strong verbal expressions displaying hostility in interaction 
• Failure to report environmental accidents harmful to other country 
• Turning to court 
• Refusing participation in meetings/summits 
-3 Hostile actions 
• Disposal of waste in shared water 
• Contamination of shared water 
• Abrogation of a water agreement 
-4 Breaking diplomatic relations 
• Intended pollution 
• Unilateral construction of water projects against another country’s protest 
• Reducing flow of water to another country 
-5 Any violent acts (that do not constitute a war) 
-6 Formal declaration of war or militarized interstate disputes 
 


















Logistic Regression Models 
 
	  	   Model 1 – Conflict Model 2 – Cooperation 
Territory in Basin                0.011                0.003 
               (0.013)               (0.005) 
External Water Dependence                0.003                0.014 
               (0.010)               (0.003)*** 
Precipitation               -0.001               -0.001 
               (0.001)               (0.001) 
GDP per capita, Large (log)                0.098               -0.093 
               (0.274)               (0.106) 
GDP per capita, Small (log)                0.185                0.187 
               (0.285)               (0.119) 
Population, Large (log)                0.243               -0.006 
               (0.247)               (0.074) 
Population, Small (log)                0.649                0.268 
               (0.183)***               (0.075)*** 
Democracy               -0.051               -0.037 
               (0.034)               (0.014)*** 
Alliance                0.061               -0.220 
               (0.337)               (0.141) 
IGO Membership               -0.032                0.009 
               (0.015)**               (0.006) 
Legal System Similarity               -0.811               -0.632 
               (0.409)**               (0.159)*** 
Distance (log)               -0.126                0.164 
               (0.288)               (0.097)* 
Contiguity                             -0.207 
                (0.162) 
Number of Riparian States                0.020                0.121 
               (0.073)               (0.015)*** 
Upstream Power               -6.978               -1.363 
               (6.272)               (2.424) 
Downstream Power              -18.665               -5.301 
               (7.815)**               (3.492) 
Years Variable               -0.748               -0.676 
               (0.381)**               (0.101)*** 
Spline 1               -0.102               -0.250 
               (0.092)               (0.404) 
Spline 2                0.285               -0.010 
               (0.366)               (0.042) 
Spline 3               -0.528                0.613 
               (0.730)               (1.063) 
Observations 3035 3531 
Log Pseudolikelihood -150.69 -1062.50 
Wald χ2 91.50*** 472.93*** 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; Contiguity 













Quintile of Predicted Values Conflict (Model 1) Cooperation (Model 2) 
Least-Likely Category (1-2) 4 29 
Most-Likely Category (3-5) 27 416 
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Figure 2.  
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Figure 3.  
Out-of-Sample Predictive Power: Conflict 
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Figure 4.  
Out-of-Sample Predictive Power: Cooperation 
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Out-of-Sample Predictions: Forecasting 
 
Quintile of Predicted Values Conflict Cooperation 
Least-Likely Category (1-2) 0 6 
Most-Likely Category (3-5) 13 182 




































Figure 5.  
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Figure 6.  
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Basins at Risk and Cooperative Basins in Comparison 
 
Basins at Risk – Yoffe et al. (2003) Basins at Risk – This Paper Cooperative Basins – This Paper 
Aral Sea Asi/Orontes Buzi 
Asi/Orontes Atrak Danube 
Ca Baraka Fenney 
Chiloango Daoura Hari/Harirud 
Cross Buzi Incomati 
Drin Colorado Indus 
Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna Cross Jordan 
Han Dasht Mekong 
Indus Dnieper Niger 
Irrawaddy Dniester Nile 
Jordan Don Senegal 
Kune Dra  
Kura-Araks Elancik  
La Plata Fenney  
Lake Chad Firth  
Lempa Gash  
Limpopo Grijalva  
Mekong Guir  
Nile Han  
Ob Hari/Harirud  
Okavango Ili/Kunes He  
Red Indus  
Saigon Kaladan  
Salween Kogilnik  
Senegal Lake Natron  
Song Vam Co Dong Lake Turkana  
Tigris-Euphrates Medjerda  
Yalu Mius  
Zambezi Ob  
 Oued Bon Naima  
 Ouémé  
      Rio Grande (North America) 
 Sabi  
 Samur  
 Sarata  
         St. John (North America) 
 Sujfun  
 Tafna  
 Tigris-Euphrates  
 Tijauana  
 Tumen  
 Umba  
 Volga  
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Appendix – Table 
Determinants of International River Conflict and Cooperation – Overview of Variables in 
Data 
 
Variable	   Theoretical Rationale Conceptual Description Source 
Territory in Basin The larger the percentage of a basin 
residing in a state, the less dependent it is 
on other states, making conflict less likely 
(e.g., Brochmann and Gleditsch 2012; 
Zawahri and Mitchell 2011) 
Share of a country’s surface area 
located in a given international 
river basin; weakest-link 
specification with the lowest value 
in a dyad determining the value of 
the final item 




The higher the external dependence on 
freshwater, the more salient the issue, and 
the more likely it is that conflict emerges 
(e.g., Zawahri and Mitchell 2011) 
Extent to which a country is 
dependent on external sources of 
freshwater; weakest-link 
specification with the lowest value 
in a dyad determining the value of 
the final item 
AQUASTAT 
Database 
Precipitation The higher the precipitation, the less 
salient is the issue of freshwater; this 
decreases the risk of conflict (e.g., 
Zawahri and Mitchell 2011) 
Average water precipitation in 
depth (mm/year); weakest-link 
specification with the lowest value 
in a dyad determining the value of 
the final item 
AQUASTAT 
Database 
GDP per capita, 
Large (log) 
The wealthier two states, the higher the 
likelihood of cooperation (Brochmann 
2012, 153); wealth is also an important 
aspect of the gravity model (Brochmann 
and Gleditsch 2012) 
Natural log of GDP per capita in 
constant 2000 USD in the largest 
economy of both states in a dyad 
Gleditsch 2002 
GDP per capita, 
Small (log) 
The wealthier two states, the higher the 
likelihood of cooperation (Brochmann 
2012, 153); wealth is also an important 
aspect of the gravity model (Brochmann 
and Gleditsch 2012) 
Natural log of GDP per capita in 
constant 2000 USD in the smallest 




Populous states have a higher risk of 
conflict (Brochmann and Gleditsch 2012, 
523) 
Natural log of the population in the 





Populous states have a higher risk of 
conflict (Brochmann and Gleditsch 2012, 
523) 
Natural log of the population in the 
smallest country of both states in a 
dyad 
Gleditsch 2002 
Democracy Liberal arguments postulate that joint 
democracies are more likely to cooperate 
with each other  
Polity2 item of the Polity IV Data 
with a weakest-link specification 
with the lowest value in a dyad 




Alliance Alliances constitute another form of 
cooperation; if two states are part of an 
alliance, they might cooperate in other 
issue areas as well (Brochmann 2012, 
Dichotomous variable that receives 
a value of 1 if two countries in a 







IGO Membership The joint membership in international 
organizations leads to frequent encounters 
and interactions between states; in turn, 
this lowers uncertainty and facilitates 
trust, leading to more cooperation 
(Kalbhenn 2011) 
The number of joint memberships 





The more similar the legal system of two 
states, the lower the transaction costs and 
uncertainty about an issue; this should 
enhance cooperation (e.g., Zawahri and 
Mitchell 2011). 
Categories used are civil law, 
common law, Islamic law, and 
mixed law; when two states in a 
dyad share the same legal tradition, 






Variable	   Theoretical Rationale Conceptual Description Source 
Distance (log) The higher the distance, the less likely 
that conflict emerges (e.g., Brochmann 
and Gleditsch 2012) 
Natural logarithm of the distance 
between the capital cities of the 
two states in a dyad 
Gleditsch and 
Ward 1999 
Contiguity If two countries share a land boundary, 
the more likely that conflict emerges (e.g., 
Brochmann and Gleditsch 2012) 
Dichotomous variable receiving 
the value of 1 if two states in a 





Basin-specific effects: the more riparian 
states do exist, the more difficult it may 
be to agree on common cooperative 
efforts (Kalbhenn 2011) 
Count variable for the number of 
states in a basin 
Kalbhenn and 
Bernauer 2012 
Upstream Power Geographical configuration and power 
aspects: upstream states are generally 
more powerful, while this can be 
furthered by more military capabilities 
(e.g., Brochmann and Gleditsch 2012; 
Zawahri and Mitchell 2011) 
Correlates of War National 
Material Capabilities Data for the 
upstream state 




Geographical configuration and power 
aspects: downstream states are generally 
less powerful, while this can be 
outweighed by more military capabilities 
(e.g., Brochmann and Gleditsch 2012; 
Zawahri and Mitchell 2011) 
Correlates of War National 
Material Capabilities Data for the 
downstream state 
Singer et al. 
1972 
 
References of the Appendix 
Brochmann, Marit. 2012. Signing River Treaties - Does It Improve River Cooperation? 
International Interactions 38 (2): 141-163.  
Brochmann, Marit, and Nils Petter Gleditsch. 2012. Shared Rivers and Conflict - A 
Reconsideration. Political Geography 31 (8): 519-527. Gleditsch,	   Kristian	   Skrede.	   2002.	   Expanded	   Trade	   and	   GDP	   Data.	   Journal	   of	   Conflict	  
Resolution	  46	  (5):	  712-­‐724.	  
Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede, and Michael Ward. 1999. A Revised List of Independent States 
since 1816. International Interactions 25 (4): 393-413. 
39 
 
Gibler, Douglas, and Meredith Sarkees. 2004. Measuring Alliances: The Correlates of War 
Formal Interstate Alliance Data Set, 1816-2000. Journal of Peace Research 41 (2): 211-
222. 
Kalbhenn, Anna, 2011. Liberal Peace and Shared Resources - A Fair-Weather Phenomenon? 
Journal of Peace Research 48 (6): 715-735. 
Kalbhenn, Anna, and Thomas Bernauer. 2012. International Water Cooperation and Conflict: 
A New Event Dataset. ETH Zurich. Available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2176609 and at http://www.ib.ethz.ch/research/data, accessed 
October 21, 2013. 
Marshall, Monty, and Keith Jaggers. 2004. POLITY IV Project: Political Regime 
Characteristics and Transitions. Dataset User’s Manual. College Park, MD: University of 
Maryland. 
Pevehouse, Jon, Timothy Nordstrom, and Kevin Warnke. 2004. The Correlates of War 2 
International Governmental Organizations Data Version 2.0. Conflict Management and 
Peace Science 21 (2): 101-119. Singer,	  David,	  Stuart	  Bremer,	  and	  John	  Stuckey.	  1972.	  Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, 
and Major Power War, 1820-1965. In Peace, War, and Numbers,	   edited	   by	   Bruce	  Russett,	  19-­‐48.	  Beverly	  Hills,	  CA:	  SAGE.	  
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). 2008. UCDP Database. Department of Peace and 
Conflict Research. Uppsala: Uppsala University. 
Wolf, Aaron, Jeffrey Natharius, Jeffrey Danielson, Brian Ward, and Jan Pender. 1999. 
International River Basins of the World. Water Resources Development 15 (4): 387-427. 
Zawahri, Neda, and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell. 2011. Fragmented Governance of 
International Rivers: Negotiating Bilateral vs. Multilateral Treaties. International Studies 
Quarterly 55 (3): 835-858. 
 
40 
 	  
 
